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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Gaylen R. Olsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION; and FLOWELL
ELECTRICAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
COX CONSTRUCTION C O M P A N Y ,
INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.

Case No.
13867

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action tor damages resulting from personal
injuries arising out of a (instruction accident when the
boom of a crane came in contact with uninsulated power
lines belonging to the defendant, Flowell Electrical Com-
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2
pany, and the State of Utah is alleged to be liable on
the basis of statutorjr as well as common law liability.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defrendant, State of Utah, moved for Summary
Judgment on the basis that as a matter of law plaintiff's
Complaint failed to state a cause of action against it.
On the 8th day of October, 1974, the Honorable Maurice
Harding granted the Motion and entered a Judgment in
favor of said defendant and against the plaintiff, No
Cause of Action. (R. 9.) Prior thereto, defendant, Flowell
Electrical Association, Inc., filed a similar Motion, and on
the 24th day of May, 1974, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor
granted the Motion and entered a Judgment in favor of
said defendant and against plaintiff, No Cause of Action.
(R. 87, 88.) Both Judgments became final on October 8,
1974.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the aforesaid Judgments
of No Cause of Action and a remand of the case for a
hearing on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident which is the subject of this cause of
action occurred on September 6, 1972, near Meadow,
Utah. On that date, plaintiff's employer was acting as
the general contractor for the State of Utah for the construction of Interstate 15 and was in the process of constructing a required southbound lane of a north to south
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overpass. Approximately 31 feet above and to the south
end of the overpass were electrical wires owned, controlled and maintained by the defendant, Flowell Electrical Association, Inc. Plaintiff's employer had planned
to pour the cement for the concrete deck of the overpass
by use of a concrete pump. However, on that date the
pump had failed, so a craneJboom bucket combination,
which had been maintained for such possibility, was being utilized.
At the time of the accident and immediately prior
thereto, plaintiff was engaged as a laborer for Cox Construction Company and was working alongside the crane
releasing cement for the bucket attached to the end of
that crane's 50 foot boom when the boom inadvertently
came in contact with the live, overhead wires. Plaintiff
was struck by a bolt of electrical current consisting of
14,400 volts which had passed from those wires through
the boom and into his body. Resultant injuries included
the amputation of both legs below the knee and severe
burns and tissue damage to both hands and arms.
Plaintiff's Complaint against Flowell Electrical Association, Inc., was based upon Flowell's negligence in
maintaining live, high voltage, uninsulated wires in a
construction area where the probability existed that a
crane or other construction equipment could come into
such close proximity to those wires that damage and injury could result unless those wires were de-energized at
least while such equipment was in close proximity to
those wires. (R. 192.)
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Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
evidence shows that about a week prior to the accident
Brent Cox, general foreman for Cox Construction Company, had contacted Ralph Robinson, the representative
of the defendant, Flowell, and Mr. Cox and Mr. Robinson made a joint inspection of the construction area.
While at that site, Robinson concluded that if the crane
and 50 foot boom combination were to be used for pouring of cement for the southbound lane of the overpass,
the overhead electrical wires would become involved and,
therefore, further action had to be taken. (Cox Deposition pp. 99-102.) After the accident occurred, at an investigatory hearing held by the Industrial Commission,
Mr. Cox and Mr. Robinson appeared and testified that
the arrangements cona^rning the lines were as follows:
"Vance said Brent did you contact the Pbwer
Company previous to this pour?
Brent said yes..
Vance said who did you contact?
Brent said Ralph.
Ralph said yes he did contact me.
Vance said is it your policy to have someone
of your approval in the area when they are working around power lines?
Ralph said the arrangement made was that
Brent would contact us, Flowell Electric, when
they were ready to have someone there and we
would kill the line.
Vance said did he do this?
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Ralph said no we were never notified.
Vance said we require workmen contact the
utility co., gas co., or whatever the case may be.
They must have a representative at the project
site at the time if at all possible. If they can kill
the line this is what we would like to have done.
Ralph said this was the arrangement we
made we told Brent to let us know a day ahead
so we could schedule a man to be there until
they were through and to shut the power off."
(R. 42.)
The evidence furaher showed that the reason Mr.
Robinson was never notified of the impending use of the
crane was because the offices in Fillmore were closed at
the required time and Cox was unable to locate him or
any other representative of the electrical company. (Cox
Deposition pp. 24, 25, 32, 33, 91, 92.)
Plaintiff's Complaint against the State of Utah was
two-fold. First, as to the State Industrial Commission
and second, to the State Road Commission.
As to the Industrial Commission, the Ctomplaint
alleged that contrary to Section 35-1-16(1), the Commission had failed to supervise this construction site and
enforce the laws intended for the protection of the life,
health, safety and welfare of the plaintiff. Specifically,
that defendant allowed the general contractor to adopt
a construction procedure which subjected the plaintiff
to an unreasonable risk of harm, failed to direct the plaintiffs employer to furnish plaintiff with proper equipment
for the work he was performing, failed to supervise the
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use of the crane to insure the safety of plaintiff and
finally, failed to have the electrical wires of Flowell deenergized before pennitting the crane to come in close
proximity to those uninsulated, high voltage overhead
wires. (R. 190.)
The evidence taken in the light most favorable to
plaintiff showed that the Industrial Commission was
familiar with the provisions of the Code and that it implemented the duties enumerated therein by promulgating detailed safety rules and regulations which were published and distributed to all contractors throughout the
State including a rule which provided that no equipment
should come within ten feet of any electrical wires when
working around such wires. (Gronning Deposition pp*
5, 13.) In addition, tlie Commission maintained safety
inspectors who were iissigned to specific areas of the
State with directions to make periodic inspections of construction sites to insure that the contractors were performing their work in a safe manner and in accordance
with the safety procedures of the Commission, and armed
with the delegated authority to order the stoppage of any
procedure they found which may be in violation of safety
rules and regulations. (Gronning Deposition pp. 7, 11,
12, 13.)
The Commission has deputized other individuals not
on the payroll of the Industrial Commission, under certaintain circumstances, to represent the Commission in
the enforcement of its safety rules and regulations. This
procedure has been followed in situations where the State
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Road Commission is involved in an extensive project
like the one involved in this case. (Gronning Deposition
p, 18.) In spite of this, the record reveals that the only
time the safety inspector assigned to this area ever contacted the Cox Construction Company concerning this
project was sometime during the month of January or
February of 1972, approximately six months before the
accident. Further, this inspector failed to acquaint himself with the project or to note that the plans for the
highway required the Cox Construction Company to be
working beneath those uninsulated, high voltage electrical
wires, and neither the safety inspector assigned to this
area nor any deputized representative of the Industrial
Commission was present at the construction site at the
time of the accident.
As to the State Road Commission, the Complaint
alleged that it was the governmental agency which employed plaintiff's empbyer to perform the work engaged
in at the time of the accident and that it was negligent
in the manner in which it supervised the activities of
plaintiff's employer. (R. 191.) Again, the evidence taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff established that
an employee of the Road Commission, Franklyn Drew
Rasmussen, was at the construction site in the capacity of
not only a cement inspector but also a designated safety
inspector. This employee was aware of the fact the lines
were not de-energized, saw the crane being used near
these wires, and instructed that the crane be moved.
(Rasmussen Deposition pp. 13, 19, 24, 25.) The contrac-
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tor, after this order, did in fact move the crane. Thereafter, this same employee again noticed that this hazardous situation was retwuiring, so this time he personally
went to the crane operator and told that operator that he
was too close to the wires to be safe. However, he did
not specify the distance the operator was to remain from
the line, did not specify that the work should cease, and
did not make any other suggestions other than merely
indicating that the crane was getting too close to the
wires. (Rasmussen Deposition p. 25.) Specifically, the
inspector explained to the Industrial Commission after
the accident:
"I had become concerned about the crane
being too close to the power line. I had them
move it about 20 minutes before the accident
happened. Then about one or two minutes before it happened, I asked them to move the crane
again/' (R. 129.)
Under the points of this brief, plaintiff will present
in more detail the specific relationship between each defendant and the basis upon which plaintiff contends the
trial court committed error in granting the Judgments of
No Cause of Action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANT, FLOWELL ELECTRICAL
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ASSOCIATION, INC. AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
The defendant, Flowell Electrical Association, Inc.,
had a duty to take proper safety precautions after being
notified that contraction was being conducted around
their wires. The regulations of the Utah State Industrial
Commission Section 61-2 provide as follows:
"When it is necessary to work in close proximity of power lines, the utility company which
operates the lines shall be notified concerning
such work. If it is deemed advisable, such lines
may be killed. If 10 feet of clearance cannot be
maintained, then the lines shall be killed or other
positive safety procedures followed to prevent
contact."
The standard of care required by an electrical company to abide by this duty has been defined in Brigham
v. Moon Electric Association, 29 Utah 2d 292, 470 P. 2d
393, as follows:
"Therefore, a high degree of duty is upon
one who transmits electricity in high tension
wires to see that no harm befalls a person rightfully in proximity thereto when that person is
himself guilty of no wrong doing. In other words,
the highest degree of care must be used to prevent harm from coming to others."
The above statement is in conformity with the general accepted law. In 29 C. J. S., Electricity, Section
339, it is stated:
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"It may be stated as a general rule that one
maintaining electric wires and appliances is required to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent man would exercise under the circumstances, or care <x>mmensurate with, or proportionate to the dangers. * * * Those engaged of the business of conducting electricity
over high voltage wires are bound to exercise
greater precaution in its use than if the property were of less dangerous character, and are,
therefore, bound to anticipate more remote possibilities of danger."
In addition to the requirement of exercising a high
degree of care, there is another principle of law which
is applicable to this case. This principle is clearly defined in 69 A. L. R. 2d 104, wherein it is stated:
"The principle basis for determining liability of a power company for injuries resulting
from contact between its wires and a crane or
other moveable machine is the foreseeability of
a situation arising which might lead to such injuries. If a reasonable prudent person in the
position of the defendant should have anticipated dangers to others from its installations,
the defendant may be held liable.
This is so, even though the exact situation
that caused the injury may not have been reasonably foreseeable."
In this regard, the record demonstrates that Flowell
Electrical Association, Inc. was aware that the overpass
was going to be constructed in close proximity to their
wires, and if the crane was utilized, the height of its
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boom exceeded the height of its electrical wires by at
least 15 feet. The electrical company was also well aware
of the Industrial Commission's regulation that an agent
be at the project site anytime work was being conducted
around the wires so that with its special expertise, it
would be in a position to abide by the Industrial safety
regulations and kill the lines. In addition, the company
knew that the boom would have to be extended and that
workmen would be required to be near the crane to handle the cement bucket leading from the boom, and if that
boom should inadvertently contact the uninsulated overhead wires, 14,400 volts of dectridty would be discharged
through the boom and into any person in close proximity
to the crane. Finally, plaintiff submits that the dectrical
company should have appreciated that with a construction project of such magnitude, any unnecessary construction delay would result in a severe financial loss to
the contractor; and, therefore, that a reasonable contractor would attempt to avoid such delay.
Knowing these facts, Flowell still failed to maintain
an agent at the construction site while the equipment
was operating in the area of those wires. Further, it
failed to "kill" the wires or make arrangements of bypassing those wires until construction in that area had
terminated. Instead, it selected an alternate course of
action whereby it would kill those wires only alter being
notified by the contractor that the boom was being used
in the immediate area of those wires. Finally, after selecting this alternate course, which plaintiff submits was
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fraught with danger, Flowell compounded this danger
by failing to maintain a manner which would insure that
it could be contacted and informed when that boom was
being moved into the immediate area of those wires.
Plaintiff submits that a reasonable prudent person
would have realized this alternate course, and other action taken, created an unreasonable risk of harm to persons working in proximity to those wires. It is common
knowledge that in this day of necessity for the construction of highways, contractors are under a duty to perform within a specific time and are not able to delay
their work without severe financial repercussions. This
is so, particularly in this area of the State where weather
plays an important part in the determination of when
construction work may be done, that contractors must
take advantage of all available working hours.
The facts demonstrated that on the date of the accident, the contractor utilized every reasonable means available to contact the agent of Flowell in order to have the
power in Flowell's lines killed while the crane and boom
were being used in close proximity to its wires. The contractor had no way of knowing whether FlowelTs agents
had absented themselves from the office or their homes
for merely an hour or a day or whether their absence
would be substantially protracted. Due to this lack of
knowledge, the contractor did not act unpredictably in
deciding to proceed with the eonstraction in spite of the
possible dangers. Plaintiff respectfully submits that under those facts, reasonable minds could differ as to
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whether or not the electrical company exercised the high
degree of care required in two major respects.
First, in its failure to conform to the safety regulations promulgated by the Utah State Industrial Commission in assigning an agent of the electrical company to
this specific construction area in order that said agent
could be on the job when this boom was moved under
the wires. Plaintiff submits such requirement is not an
unreasonable request when the facts indicate the boom
was utilized in this area for less than one full working
day.
Second, in its failure, after selecting the alternate
course, to have its offices open during reasonable working hours so that the contractor could make contact and
inform it that the crane was working under the wires.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, BY AND
T H R O U G H ITS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, NO
CAUSE OF ACTION.
The defendant, Industrial Commission of Utah, had
a statutory duty to the plaintiff in this matter arising
under Section 35-1-16(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, which provides in part as follows:
"It shall be the duty of the Commission and
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it shall have full power^ jurisdiction and authority,:
(1) to supervise every employment and
place of employment and to administer and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health,
safety and welfare of employees."
The responsibility of the Commission under that
statute to see that the contractor furnishes plaintiff with
a safe place to work was reaffirmed in the recent case of
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P. 2d 997 (1972).
There the plaintiffs were dependents of an employee of
a general contractor esngaged in the construction of the
sports center of the University of Utah. That employee
was killed when a scaffolding fell from the ceiling and
the heirs brought the action against the architect and
a number of other contractors. In affirming the Summary
Judgment granted by the trial court as to the architect,
this Count made reference to the cited section of the
Code above and stated:
"He owed no duty to the subcontractors or
their employees in connection with the scaffolding. His responsibility was to his client, the
owner of the building, and his duty in that regard was to see that the sports arena was properly erected so that it would be safe for the uses
for which it would be put when finished. It is
the duty of the Industrial Commission and not
of the architect to see the contractors furnish
their employees with safe places to work." (Emphasis added.)
In spite of the clear language of the statute and the
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reaffirmance by this Court that the Industrial Commission did in fact have a legal duty under that statute, the
Industrial Commission still asserts that it had no duty
to be at the construction site to supervise the area and
insure that the site be reasonably safe for plaintiffs
work. The Industrial Commission argues that the legislature placed such a heavy burden of supervision upon
it, that it is impossible for its agents to perform their
delegated duties, and for that reason, it cannot be held
liable for any injury which may result from its failure
to meet that burden.
It is not unusual for the legislature, however, to
place such a general and broad duty of supervision upon
a governmental agency created expressly for the purpose
of protecting persons in this State who are without any
means of protecting themselves. For example, the legislature has delegated such broad responsibility to the Utah
State Road Commission under section 27-12-8 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, which provides in part:
"The commission shall have the following powers
and duties in addition to such other powers and
duties as may be provided by law:
*

*

*

(5) To adopt such regulations governing
the use by the public of state highways as may
be necessary to provide for public safety and
against undue use of the state highways.
(6) To provide for highway safety under
the direction of a qualified highway safety engineer whose duty it shall be to conduct high-
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way safety surveys and locate, designate and recommend the removal by the state road commission of highway hazards to safety."
This is not merely a product of recent legislatures
either. Ptor example, during the 1919 session the Legislature enacted a statute delegating to the county governmental agencies the broad and general responsibility of
maintaining all roads within the county. That statute
provided:
Laws of Utah, 1919, Chapter 55, Section 2823
"The County Road Commissioner, where appointed, under the direction and supervision of
the Board of County Commissioners shall:
1. Take charge of the public roads within
the county, and employ and direct such competent help as may be necessary to properly perform his duties."
The legal effect of the statute and its application
to a specific case was considered by this Court in Romney v. Lynch, 58 Utah 479, 199 P. 974 (1921). In that
case the defendant was a general contractor for the State
Road Commission in the construction of a State highway
between Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah. Pursuant to
the terms of his contract, the defendant was required to
provide a detour over a dedicated Davis County road.
Plaintiff, while traveling by automobile, followed the
direction of the defendant by taking that detour and,
thereafter, while attempting to pass another automobile,
an accident occurred which plaintiff claimed was due
to the defective and dangerous condition of that detour.
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Plaintiff alleged that defendant^ as the contractor, had
selected the detour and was responsible for the accident
because of the unsafe detour road. A demiurrer to the
Complaint was granted by the trial court, and this court
affirmed, emphasizing:
"Under the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah
1917, §§ 2800, 5848, subd. 15, the Davis County
road, on which the accident of which plaintiff
complains occurred, is deemed a public highway.
As such it was under the direction and supervision of the county commissioners of Davis
county and it was the duty of said commissioners to keep the road clear of obstructions and
in good repair. Section 2823, as amended by Laws
Utah 1919, c. 55.
It is therefore difficult to conceive upon
what theory the defendant might be held to respond in damages for failure to keep in good
repair the public road or highway in question.
*

*

*

If any legal duty, express or implied, under
the facts pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, rested
upon the defendant to maintain the Davis county
road reasonably safe for travel, then we have
indeed entered upon a new field of personal liabilities for judicial investigation and determination.
Let it be conceded, as was contention made
by the plaintiff, that defendant by his acts in
closing the Clearfield-Siinset Highway and directing travel to the Davis county road thereby
adopted the latter as a detour, then as a matter of law we think defendant had a right to
use it for that purpose without assuming the re-
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sponsibilities that rested upon the county commissioners of Davis county of properly maintaining it. If the public highways of this state are
open and presumed to be reasonably safe for the
legitimate use of all citizens alike, then what
good reason can be assigned why a contractor
may not properly and rightfully avail himself
of their use as a detour for the traveling public
while he is engaged in the performance of work,
such as the defendant here was undertaking to
do, without having visited upon him the results
occasioned by the negligence of the officials
whose plain statutory duty it was to properly
maintain them?"
Although no decision has been rendered by this Court
since the passage of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act in 1965 construing the similar language contained in
section 27-12-8, supra, that basis of liability does not
appear to have been removed by this Court.
A reasonable basis upon which the legislature could
have imposed such a duty upon the Industrial Commission does, therefore, exist. If it were determined that
the defendant performed its duty in a negligent manner,
a reasonable basis exists upon which liability could be
imposed. Plaintiff contends that under the facte of the
case at bar, reasonable minds could determine that this
duty was negligently performed.
As previously noted, the contract between the State
and Cox Construction Company was executed during the
month of November, 1972, and a safety inspector was
assigned to the section of the highway to be constructed
by Cox Construction Company. The evidence established
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that this safety inspector, Mr. Vance Abbott, made only
one contact with Cox Cooostniction Company in February
of 1973, when he discussed with the general foreman the
commission safety rules and regulations. On the date
of that meeting, however, the construction company had
not even commenced work. That inspector failed to examine the plans and specifications so as to determine if
there were any areas where hazardous and dangerous
conditions might exist for the employees of Cox Construction Company. In addition, that inspector failed to determine if the pending construction of the highway necessitated employees of Cox Construction Company to be
engaged in work in close proximity to uninsulated electrical wires with either a crane or other equipment, Finanlly, on the date of the accident, the safety inspector
was not even aware of the location of the Cox Construction Company or that the company was building an overpass directly underneath high voltage uninsulated electrical wires. The sole excuse for the failure of this inspector to make inspections after the inspection of February, 1973, was the work load required of him.
Finally, to insure that sufficient inspectors were available to see that the contractor furnished its employees
with a safe place to work, the Commission has, in similar
situations, deputized other employees at the site to perform the duties of a duly appointed safety inspector.
However, that procedure was not ever followed in this
case.
Plaintiff contends that the above facts, considered in
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light of this paitiailar accident, clearly indicate that
reasonable minds could determine that the Industrial
Commission failed to properly discharge its duty.
Plaintiff respectfully contends, therefore, that the
trial court eired in granting the defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and entering a Judgment in favor
of the defendant, State of Utah, and against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE S T A T E O F U T A H , BY AND
THROUGH ITS ROAD COMMISSION AND
AGAINST PLAINTIFF, NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
As previously stated, the liability of the State Road
Commission was alleged on the basis of the failure of its
safety inspector to exercise reasonable care after becoming aware that plaintiff was being exposed to the dangerous and hazardous situation of working in close proximity to overhead electrical wires which were not de-energized. Mr. F. Drew Rasmussen, as the employee of the
Utah State Road Commission, was assigned to the Cox
Construction project in the dual capacity of a cement
inspector and a safety inspector. He knew that when
the crane-bucket combination was utilized for the pouring
of cement, that the overhead wires of the defendant,
Flowell Company, were not de-enecrgized, and as the work
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progressed, realized that no specific employee had been
assigned to the duty of controlling the distance between
the crane and the overhead wires.
The evidence demonstrated that at one time when
the danger became acutely obvious, he ordered the foreman to have the crane moved. Sometime after the crane
had been moved in accordance with his orders, this inspector again noticed that the crane operator was not
maintaining a proper clearance, and this time, instead of
going to the foreman, he went directly to the crane operator to register his complaint. This time, however, neither
the crane operator nor the foreman followed his instructions or heeded his warnings, and the boom was allowed
to come in contact with the wires releasing the electricity
and subsequently injuring the plaintiff.
It is the position of the plaintiff that when Rasmussen, as an agent of the Road Commission and acting
within the scope of his employment, undertook to control the movement of the crane, that he was under a duty
to perform that undertaking in a reasonable, prudent
manner; and if he failed to do so, that failure would constitute a basis for liability for resulting damages. This
reasoning is confirmed by numerous authorities which
have addressed themselves to the fact that any person
who, for whatever reason, assumes to perform a duty,
although that duty may not be specifically delegated to
him, must exercise that duty with due care.
Restatement of Torts, Second, explains this concept
Under Section 323, which provides:
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"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's parson or things, is subject
to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases
the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking."
And, again, at Stetion 324 A:
"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to
liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of
the other or the third person upon the undertaking."
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61,
76 S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48, the United States had undertaken to maintain a lighthouse, had not acted with
due care in so doing, and plaintiff's ship was damaged
as a result. In explaining the consequences of such an
undertaking, the court; explained:
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"[I]t is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby
induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner. * * * The
Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse
service. But once it exercised its discretion to
operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by
the light, it was obligated to use due care to
make certain that the light was kept in good
working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further
obligated to use due care to discover this fact
and to repair the light or give warning that it
was not functioning. If ifae Coast Guard failed
in its duty and damage was thereby caused to
petitioners, the United States is liable under the
Tort Claims Act."
There have also been a series of cases recently in
which compensation insurance carriers who voluntarily
undertook to perform safety inspections and negligently
performed those inspections on the employer's premises
have been found to be answerable for such negligence
as third parties.
See Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App.
55 158 N. W. 2d 786; Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,
31 111. 2d 69, 199 N. E. 2d 769, revg. 39 111. App. 2d 73,
187 N. E. 2d 425; Bryant v. Old Republic Ins. Co., (C. A.
6 Ky.) 431 F. 2d 1385; and the similar cases cited in 93
A. L. R. 2d 598.
In such cases, the Courts have refused to impose
liability on the basis of the statutory construction of their
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specific Workmen's Compensation Acts. However, even
in those cases, the Courts have emphasized that any
"bona fide" third party who voluntarily undertook to
perform safety inspections would be liable therefore if
the inspection is negligently performed.
Thus, in this case a jury could well find that Rasmussen, as an employee of the State Road Commission,
in properly discharging his duty, should have either
stopped the contractor or continued his supervision of
the operation of the crane. Had he done so, this case
would never have been brought before this Court. Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully submits that it is clear that
the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint as
against the State of Utah and entering a Judgment of
No Cause of Action.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFFS
EMPLOYER WAS THE SOLE, PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
Defendants have contended throughout this trial that
even if sufficient evidence were to be shown to support
a finding of negligence on their part, that plaintiff would
still not be entitled to any recovery because the action
of the crane operator in coming in contact with the wires
was the sole, proximate cause of the accident. Defendants
have claimed that the earlier derision of this Court in
Toma v. Utah Power and Light Company, 12 Utah 2d
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278, 365 P. 2d 788 (1961), is controlling since that decision held that the action of the crane operator was, as
a matter of law, the sole, proximate cause of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that the decision rendered in the Toma
case, supra, must be confined to the facts of that case
and has no application in the case at bar. Further, a careful analysis of the facts and law involved indicates that
the conduct of the crane operator in the case at bar was
nothing more than a contributing cause, and, therefore,
an issue of fact is presented regarding causation.
In the Toma case, supra, the record was clear that
the electrical company, prior to the accident, had cooperated with the contractor in having the doctrical current
well under control before any construction work was performed in close proximity to the wires. Also in the Toma
case the record indicated that all parties involved were
fully aware of the construction area, the proximity of the
wires to the construction work, the nature and type of
equipment being used, and that the power company had
left their telephone number to be contacted, if necessary.
On the basis of these facts, the lower court, in the Toma
case granted a Motion for a Directed Verdict. This Court,
in affirming that ruling, held there was an issue of negligence but ruled that the subsequent negligence on the
part of the crane operator was the sole, proximate cause.
This Court held:
"Proximate cause has been defined as the
cause next in relation to cause and effect. That
which in natural sequence, unbroken by any effi-
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cient, intervening cause produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. That which is nearest in the order of
causation. The last negligent act contributory
to an injury without which such injury would
not have resulted. The dominant cause, tine moving or producing cause, this cause may be an act
or omission. Proximate cause may be distinguished from immediate cause. The immediate
cause is generally referred to in the law as the
nearest cause in point of time and space, while
the act or omission may be the proximate cause
of an injury without being the immediate cause.
The proximate cause may be more remote in time
or space but closer to the result and is the responsible cause. When the causes are independent of each other, the nearest is, of course, to
be charged with the accident and resultant injury.
In the Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.
case we held:
"More than one separate act of negligence, even though they do not happen simultaneously, may be proximate causes of an
injury. * * * When one does an act or
omits to take a precaution and under the
circumstances, as an ordinary prudent person, he ought reasonably to foresee that his
act or omission will thereby expose interests of another to unreasonable risk of harm
such person may be liable for resulting injuries caused by any reasonable foreseeable
conduct whether it be innocent, negligent or
even criminal. * * *
"One cannot excuse himself from liability arising froan his negligent acts merely
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because the later negligence of another concurs to cause an injury, if the later act was
a legally foreseeable event.
"Where one has negligently caused a
dangerous situation and a later actor observes or circumstances are such that he cannot fail to observe, such condition, but later
actor negligently failed to avoid it, as a matter of law, the later intervening act interrupts the natural sequence of events and
cute off the legal effect of the negligence of
the initial actor but if conduct of later intervening actor is such that he negligently fails
to observe a dangerous condition until it is
too late to avoid it, question whether later
intervening act supersedes negligence of initial actor is for jury."
Strenuous efforts have been repeatedly made
to have us reverse or at least modify the Hillyard case, particularly as it has to do with the
determination of when proximate cause becomes
a jury question. It has been vigorously argued
that this case imposes a severe and unreasonable
burden upon the plaintiff, and works a grave injustice upon an innocent injured person. The injured person is often stopped from holding responsible one joint tort feasor while prevailing
against the other. Regardless of these many
efforts we have consistently upheld our decision
in the Hillyard case."
In short, Toma was not a new concept but merely
a reaffirmance by this Court of their earlier HUlyard
decision. However, under HUlyard, in order for the subsequent negligent conduct to be the sole, proximate cause
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of the accident, such conduct must meet the test of being an independent intervening cause. The Toma decision made no specific reference to the fact that the action by that crane operator was an independent, intervening cause; and, in fact, that legal concept was never
discussed in the majority decision. However, Hillyard
clearly discussed this matter and established that in
order for the conduct of the second actor to be an independent, intervening cause, his act must not have been
foreseeable by the original negligent person. In applying this to the case at bar, plaintiff contends that it was
reasonably foreseeable on the part of both the Flowell
Power Company and the Staite of Utah that even if the
lines were not de-energized, plaintiff's employer would
still continue to perform the construction work under
the wires. This differs from the facts of Toma where
there was no basis for holding that even if the power
company negligently refused to cut the power lines, that
the contractor would continue its construction work near
the wires. The evidence was very clear that the contractor in that case did not proceed with any construction
work without having first requested that the lines be
de-energized, and the power company left its telephone
numbers for any emergencies and remained available.
In the case at bar, however, the representative of
the power company, when he made his personal inspection of the property, observed that the contractor had
performed a considerable amount of the construction
work under the wires before the company was contacted.
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Further, the instructions given by the Flowell representative to the contractor wore to the effect that, "When
you start using the crane, get in touch with us, and if
necessary, we can make arrangements to kill the lines."
Certainly a jury could find that under the circumstances
in the case at bar* it was foreseeable that if Flowell was
not contacted, that the work would still continue and a
crane operator might inadvertently come in contact with
the live wires and some damage could result.
This concept of foreseeability as to the action by
someone operating a crane under overhead wires is generally considered the crux of any case where the crane
comes in contact with the wires.
Thcere is an extensive annotation on this matter
in 69 A. L R. 2d 93. At Section 20 of this annotate,
there are a number of cases which discuss this matter,
and the annotation states that the general rule is as
follows:
"It has frequently been contended that a
power company, even though it may have been
negligent in some respects in regard to installation or maintenance of its wires, is not liable for
injuries resulting from a contact between movable machinery and a power wire, on the theory
that the power company's negligence was merely
a condition and not a cause, and that the intervening negligence of someone else, generally the
operator of the machinery, in making the contact,, was the actual cause of the injury.
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The fact that there was intervening negligence of someone other than the power company
which may have contributed to the accident will
not in itself bar recovery aginst the power company if such an intervening act could have been
reasonably foreseen.
Furthermore, even where an accident has
been caused by the intervening act of a third
party, a power company may be held liable if it
fails seasonably to correct the situation created
by such intervening negligence, with the result
that another accident occurs. See Reardon v.
Florida West Coast Power Corp. (1929) 97 Fla.
314, 120 So. 842, supra, § 11.
But nonliability on the basis of intervening
cause has usually been upheld if the intervening negligence act is of such a nature as not to
bereasonably foreseeable by the power company,
and if it has no relationship to the company's
negligence."
Plaintiff respectfully submite that the foregoing clearly indicates there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the subsequent action of the crane operator was a concurring cause of the accident.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that as to each of the
named defendants in this case, the record has established
issues of fact which can only be resolved by a jury trial.
Plaintiff contends that in view of the foregoing, that
this Honorable Court should reverse the decisions grant-
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ing defendants a Judgment of No Cause of Action and
remand this case to the District Court for a hearing on
the merits.
R^pectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS
& BLACK
By Richard C. Dibblee
Attorneys for Appellant
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